Abstract. A solution concept for n-person games is called monotonic if the players, after committing themselves to payoff vectors that solve (in the sense of this concept) the game, can still assure that every individual's payment grows with the total amount paid. The bargaining set A';', the kernel, and the nucleolus are shown to be nonmonotonic.
(ii) A solution concept S is called monotonic if for every pair of functions v, v + such that v + is greater than v and x E S(L~), there is a ye S(v+) such that yi 2 xi for each i E N.
The Shapley value (see [7] ) is a monotonic solution concept. If v + is greater than v and x is the Shapley value of (N ; v), then the Shapley value of (N ; v'), y, satisfies
The bargaining set .A(:' is a solution concept that was defined by Aumann and Maschler [I] . The kernel is another solution concept, defined by Davis and Maschler [3] , which was proved to be a nonempty subset of the bargaining set. The nucleolus is a unique-point solution concept defined by Schmeidler [ 6 ] . Schmeidler proved that the nucleolus always exists and belongs to the kernel of the game. Charnes and Kortanek [2] and, independently, Kohlberg [4] proved that the nucleolus is a piecewise linear function of the characteristic function of the game. In this paper we prove that the bargaining set, the kernel and the nucleolus are not monotonic.
The excess of a coalition S with respect to an imputation x is defined by Let 6(x) denote the (2" -1)-tuple of the numbers e(S, x ) arranged in decreasing order, i.e., 1 g i i j 2" -1 implies 6,(x) 2 Oj(x).
D E F I N I T~~N 2.
An imputation x in a game ( N ; v) is said to belong to the nucleolus of ( N ; v) if for every other imputation y, 6(x) precedes 6(y) in the lexicographical order on R2"-l .
Schmeidler [4] proved that if the nucleolus of ( N ; v) consists of exactly one point. Let us call the point itself the nucleolus.
Given an imputation x in a game ( N ; v), denote The kernel is always a subset of the bargaining set .A'(:) (Davis and Maschler [3] ). The nucleolus always belongs to the kernel (Schmeidler [6] ). PROPOSITION 7. Let ( N ; v) be the game introduced in Example 4 and let x = (1, 1, 1,2,2,2, 1, 1, 1) be its nucleolus (see Example 4). Let v + denote a characteristic function over N such that u+(S) = u(S)for each S N and v+(N) = u(N) + 1.
Under these conditions, for every y in the bargaining set -A@;) of ( N ; v + ) there exists i, 1 5 i 5 9, such that yi < x i .
Proof. Let y belong to the bargaining set .A?:'' of ( N ; v ' ) and suppose, per absurdum, that yi 2 xi for every i, i = 1, . . . , 9. Denote z = y -x. It is necessary2 that z, = z, = z, (if, for example, z, < z,, then player 7 can object against player 8, using 12367, and there is no counter objection to that by player 8). Also, (otherwise, player 4 has a justified3 objection against player 6). On the other hand, since there is no justified objection of player 6 against player 4, necessarily,
z , + min (z, , z,, z,) 5 z, + z, + z3 + Z6 + Z, See Maschler [5] for a clarification of the arguments in this proof.
An objection to which there is no counter objection will be called justijied Moreover, for each i, i = 1,2,3, there is no justified objection of i against 6 and therefore
Thus, The nucleolus of ( N ; v) belongs to the bargaining set .A(;) and to the kernel of this game. There does not exist a point in the bargaining set of (N; v') (nor in the kernel and the nucleolus of (N; v+)) that satisfies the monotonicity condition (see Definition 1). Remark 9. The nucleolus of(N; u + ) is the point (l$,l$, 1$,2$, 2$, 1$,1$, 1$,1$) and, indeed, player 6 gets less than in the game (N ; v).
